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Regulating Online Peer-to-Peer 
Lending in the Aftermath of  
Dodd–Frank: In Search of an 
Evolving Regulatory Regime 
for an Evolving Industry 
Eric C. Chaffee* 
Geoffrey C. Rapp** 
Abstract 
The 2010 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act called for a government study of the regulatory 
options for on-line Peer-to-Peer lending. On-line P2P sites, most 
notably for-profit sites Prosper.com and LendingClub.com, offer 
individual “investors” the chance to lend funds to individual 
“borrowers.” The sites promise lower interest rates for borrowers 
and high rates of return for investors. In addition to the media 
attention such sites have generated, they also raise significant 
regulatory concerns on both the state and federal level. The 
Government Accountability Office report produced in response to 
the Dodd–Frank Act failed to make a strong recommendation 
between two primary regulatory options—a multi-faceted 
regulatory approach in which different federal and state agencies 
would exercise authority over different aspects of on-line P2P 
lending, or a single-regulator approach, in which a single agency 
(most likely the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau) would 
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be given total regulatory control over on-line P2P lending. After 
discussing the origins of on-line P2P lending, its particular risks, 
and its place in the broader context of non-commercial lending, this 
paper argues in favor of a multi-agency regulatory approach for on-
line P2P that mirrors the approach used to regulate traditional 
lending. 
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I. Introduction 
Like Congress’s prior attempt to legislate a post-bubble repair 
and prevention strategy for the American economy, the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes–Oxley),1 the Dodd–Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd–Frank)2 has 
received a somewhat chilly response from legal academics.3 As was 
the case with Sarbanes–Oxley,4 however, even amid all of the 
proposals included for the sake of “doing something” rather than 
for strong policy justifications, a few nuggets of genuine value can 
be found. One of those, in the case of Dodd–Frank, is the opening 
effort to address the regulatory gap surrounding online peer-to-
peer (P2P) lending. Congress directed the Comptroller General of 
the United States and the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) to report on the ideal regulatory structure for this emerging 
and rapidly evolving segment of the fringe lending industry.5 The 
                                                                                                     
 1. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
Roberta Romano lambasted Sarbanes–Oxley in a now famous article. See 
Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1523 (2005) (arguing that the policies included 
in Sarbanes–Oxley “may be . . . characterized as recycled ideas advocated for 
quite some time by corporate governance entrepreneurs”). 
 2. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 2, 5, 7, 11, 
12, 15, 18, 20, 22, 26, 28, 31, 42, and 44 U.S.C.). 
 3. Stephen Bainbridge recently released a paper titled in homage to 
Romano’s Sarbanes–Oxley critique. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd–Frank: 
Quack Corporate Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779 (2011). One of 
this Article’s authors recently described Dodd–Frank as “at best an incomplete 
vision for increasing consumer protection and heightening corporate 
responsibility.” Eric C. Chaffee, The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act: A Failed Vision for Increasing Consumer Protection 
and Heightening Corporate Responsibility in International Financial 
Transactions, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1431, 1431 (2011). This Article’s other author 
refers to Dodd–Frank as a “missed opportunity” in a forthcoming paper. 
Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties: Will Dodd–Frank’s New 
Whistleblower Law Reform Wall Street?, BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2012). 
 4. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating 
Incentives for Sarbanes–Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 
87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 92 (2007) (calling Sarbanes–Oxley whistleblower protection 
provisions “a step in the right direction”). 
 5. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 989F, 124 Stat. 1376, 1947–48 (2010) (requiring that the 
Comptroller General of the United States and the United States Government 
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GAO Report, which contains a variety of new information and 
insights, was issued on July 7, 2011.6 
Online P2P lending is a booming industry7 that has caused 
tremendous regulatory confusion, yet it has received scant 
attention in legal scholarship. Previous work in the area among 
legal scholars has primarily addressed the role of P2P lending in 
microfinance for international development.8 Little work has 
                                                                                                     
Accountability Office conduct a study to “determine the optimal Federal 
regulatory structure” for person-to-person lending). 
 6. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-613, PERSON-TO-PERSON 
LENDING: NEW REGULATORY CHALLENGES COULD EMERGE AS THE INDUSTRY GROWS 
(2011) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d11613.pdf. 
 7. Sheryl Jean, Also on the Loan Menu, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 14, 
2010, at D01 (noting that one leading site, LendingClub.com, saw an increase in 
loan volume from $16 million in 2008 to $59 million in 2009). 
 8. See generally Kevin E. Davis & Anna Gelpern, Peer-to-Peer Financing 
for Development: Regulating the Intermediaries, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
1209 (2010); Raj M. Desai & Homi Kharas, Democratizing Foreign Aid: Online 
Philanthropy and International Development Assistance, 42 NYU J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 1111 (2010); Molly Buetz Land, Networked Activism, 22 HARV. HUMAN RTS. 
J. 205, 219–20 (2009) (discussing the peer-to-peer microlending organization 
Kiva); Sarah B. Lawsky, Money for Nothing: Charitable Deductions for 
Microfinance Lenders, 61 SMU L. REV. 1525 (2008) (arguing that taxpayers 
should be permitted to take a charitable deduction for foregone interest on 
interest-free loans through tax-exempt organizations like Kiva). In addition to 
the legal scholarship on the microfinance and international aspects of online 
P2P lending, an emerging body of work in behavioral economics examines for-
profit online P2P sites like those that are the focus of this paper. See Natialiya 
Barasinska & Dorothea Schafer, Does Gender Affect Funding Success at the 
Peer-to-Peer Credit Markets? Evidence from the Largest German Lending 
Platform 1, (DIW Berlin, Discussion Paper No. 1094, 2010), http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1738837 (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (finding no gender discrimination in 
German online P2P lending, contrary to results for US sites) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Seth Berger & Fabian Gleisner, Emergence 
of Financial Intermediaries in Electronic Markets: The Case of Online P2P 
Lending, 2 BUR – BUSINESS RESEARCH 39 (2009), http://www.business-
research.org/2009/1/finance/1940/berger-gleisner-emergence.pdf (examining role of 
groups and paid intermediaries on Prosper.com); Jefferson Duarte et al., Trust 
and Credit 4–5 (June 2, 2010) (unpublished paper presented at the American 
Finance Association’s 2010 Atlanta Meeting), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1343275 (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (finding that 
borrowers viewed as untrustworthy are less likely to receive loans on 
Prosper.com) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Craig R. 
Everett, Group Membership, Relational Banking and Loan Default Risk: the 
Case of Online Social Lending 26 (Mar. 15, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1114428 (last visited Apr. 8, 
2012) (finding that membership in a social lending group reduces risk of default 
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addressed the proper scope of regulation for domestic for-profit 
online P2P lending, other than a forthcoming piece arguing that 
online P2P should be completely exempt from securities 
regulation9—a position we challenge in this Article. 
Like many GAO studies, the online P2P Report is written at a 
broad level and avoids specific recommendations.10 Still, it may 
                                                                                                     
on Prosper.com) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Seth 
Freedman & Ginger Zhe Jin, Do Social Networks Solve Information Problems 
for Peer-to-Peer Lending? Evidence from Prosper.com (Networks, Elec. 
Commerce, and Telecomm. Inst., Working Paper No. 08-43, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1304138 (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (identifying 
information gaps in original Prosper.com lending model) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Michal Herzenstein et al., Strategic Herding 
Behavior in Peer-to-Peer Lending (Apr. 27, 2010) http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1596899 (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (finding that lenders on Prosper 
engage in strategic herding behavior) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Michal Herzenstein et al., Tell Me a Good Story and I May Lend You 
My Money: The Role of Narratives in Peer-to-Peer Lending Decisions (May 13, 
2010) (unpublished paper), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1840668 (last visited Apr. 
8, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Mingfeng Lin et al., 
Judging Borrowers by the Company They Keep: Friendship Networks and 
Information Asymmetry in Online Peer-to-Peer Lending 29 (July 1, 2011) 
(unpublished paper presented at the Western Finance Association’s 2009 
Annual Meeting), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1355679 (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) 
(finding that the number of online friendships is a signal of credit quality for 
borrowers on Prosper.com) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
Devin G. Pope & Justin R. Sydnor, What’s in a Picture? Evidence of 
Discrimination from Prosper.com, 46 J. HUM. RESOURCES 53, 53 (2011) (finding 
racial disparities in Prosper.com lending when site formerly used pictures for 
borrower profiles). While such work explores a number of interesting questions 
and is potentially of great value in crafting narrow regulations relating to P2P 
lending, it sheds relatively little light on the threshold regulatory questions 
addressed in this paper, such as whether securities regulation should apply to 
P2P lending. Moreover, most of this work was based on earlier versions of the 
for-profit site Prosper.com, which has since substantially changed its business 
model. 
 9. See Andrew Verstein, The Misregulation of Person-to-Person Lending, 
45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 26), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1823763 (last visited Apr. 8, 
2012) (“While it is plausible that P2P notes were either ‘investment contracts’ or 
‘notes’ for the purposes of the Securities Acts, there is also a strong case that 
they are neither.”).  
 10. See, e.g., Jeffery M. Johnson & Carl Jensen, The Financing of 
Terrorism, 2010 J. INST. JUST. INT’L STUD. 103, 109 (noting that the GAO REPORT 
on terrorism provides an overview but lacks discussion of specifics); Timothy 
Inklebarger, DOL Calls GAO Target Date Fund Recommendations Vague, 
PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.pionline.com/article/2011 
0307/PRINTSUB/303079977 (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the 
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spur some legislative action toward clarifying the regulation of 
P2P sites. The Report outlines two possible regulatory schemes: 
the continued regulation of the investors in P2P sites by securities 
regulators, with regulation of borrowers the responsibility of 
various financial services agencies; or unified regulation under a 
single agency, such as the new Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB).11 The Report does not provide a recommendation 
as between these two options, leaving the future of P2P lending 
regulation uncertain. This Article aims to fill the current 
regulatory gap and provide a recommended roadmap, as well as 
context, for online P2P lending.  
Online P2P sites have faced tough scrutiny at the hands of 
American securities regulators, both on the state12 and federal 
levels.13 Applications by leading platforms to operate in particular 
states have been rejected, and the SEC, for a time, prohibited 
leading sites from soliciting new lenders.14 Much of the regulatory 
uncertainty surrounding how these sites should be classified stems 
from what might be described as a “square peg, round hole” 
problem. Existing structures for securities regulation have simply 
not envisioned an investment opportunity in which the party 
seeking financing provides little or no disclosure to potential 
sources of capital. Moreover, in a sense, online P2P represents the 
perfect securities regulation exam hypothetical, incorporating 
thorny and long-puzzling issues such as the definition of a security, 
the concept of material review used by some state regulators, and 
the meaning of such key identities as issuers, exchanges, and the 
like. 
                                                                                                     
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 11. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 42. 
 12. Brent Hunsberger, Peer-to-Peer Lending: Know the Risks, OREGONIAN (Oct. 
4, 2009), http://blog.oregonlive.com/finance/2009/10/peer-to-peer_lending_know_ 
the.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). For example, LendingClub has no authorization to sell securities in 
Oregon, among several other states. Id. Prosper was licensed in Oregon but fined 
$15,000 “for selling unregistered securities and not properly disclosing their risks.” 
Id. 
 13. Farhad Manjoo, On this Site, a Stranger Will Spot You Some Cash, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 2011, at G04 (stating that Prosper.com was shut down for 
nine months after the SEC found it had offered unregistered securities). 
 14. Id. 
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This Article recommends neither the “hands-off” approach to 
regulating online P2P sites that would flow from the assertion that 
they do not sell securities nor prohibition of online P2P lending. 
Instead, it argues that online P2P sites should be regulated not by 
a single administrative agency but in the same manner as 
traditional banking entities. Multiple regulators should oversee 
online P2P sites, depending on the particular aspect of online P2P 
that falls within an agencies’ regulatory authority. While this 
approach may not leave P2P sites free to evolve in an unfettered 
hyper-Darwinian fashion, it offers the best chance to protect both 
lenders and borrowers from the risks arising as lending goes 
digital. 
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows: Part II 
offers an overview of online P2P lending, discussing the structure 
and business model of various sites, the historical and 
contemporary context for P2P lending, the importance of P2P 
lending’s recent emergence, and the risks these sites pose to users. 
Part III analyzes the current regulatory regime for P2P lending, 
which is governed on the borrower side by banking law and on the 
lender side by federal and state securities law. Part IV discusses 
the struggle to create a coherent regulatory regime for P2P 
lending, including a study of such lending and various regulatory 
options mandated by Dodd–Frank. Finally, Part V recommends 
that an organic approach be taken to regulate online P2P lending 
in which multiple regulators have oversight and use their 
individual expertise from regulating traditional lending to create 
and adapt regulation to the evolving world of online P2P lending. 
II. An Overview of Online Peer-to-Peer Lending 
A. The Basics of Online Peer-to-Peer Lending 
In its most general form, online P2P lending can be defined as 
any transaction arranged using the Internet in which one or more 
individuals lend money to one or more other individuals. 
“Traditional” lending, by contrast, involves an institutional lender 
such as a commercial bank, credit union, and the like, lending 
money to an individual. The cornerstone of P2P lending is that 
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individuals, rather than institutions, stand on both sides of the 
transaction. 
Pure online P2P lending could be structured without a formal 
intermediary, with only the communications pipelines of the World 
Wide Web facilitating the transaction. For instance, a person 
could, legalities aside, post an advertisement on Craigslist 
(Craigslist.com) seeking a loan for a particular purpose and 
offering a certain interest rate.15 Or a Facebook (Facebook.com) 
user could send messages to distant “friends” offering to lend them 
money for a specified rate of return. 
Of course, while such P2P lending could arise, assuming a 
hospitable regulatory environment, the transaction costs 
associated with it would be relatively high. The level of fraud and 
outright criminality on Craigslist and other “open” web platforms 
is incredibly high,16 making it nearly impossible to find legitimate 
lending and borrowing partners without extensive additional 
investigation of potential counterparts. The Facebook alternative 
would be limited in that if one can only reach active participants in 
one’s own networks, one has fewer potential partners to reach 
(even if a person has more “friends” than a typical law professor). 
To capture profits associated with reducing such transaction 
costs, online P2P lending sites have emerged. The essential selling 
point advanced by P2P sites is the notion that by eliminating the 
“middle man”—the commercial bank in a traditional loan—
investors can earn higher returns and borrowers can obtain 
financing at lower rates.17 Such sites have been around since 2005 
in Europe, where the U.K.’s Zopa was an early leader.18 The most 
                                                                                                     
 15. In fact, some would-be borrowers have attempted to do just that. One 
posting in the financial services section of the Washington, D.C. Craigslist 
sought a “$75,000 loan” to start a new owner-operated trucking company. Loan 
Needed/Great Collateral (Westminster), CRAIGSLIST (Dec. 31, 2011, 9:42 AM 
EST), http://www.webcitation.org/64QPrGAyR (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 16. See Aleksandra Todorova, A Craigslist Scam You Might Fall For, 
SMARTMONEY (Aug. 10, 2005), http://www.smartmoney.com/spend/family-
money/a-craigslist-scam-you-might-fall-for/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (noting 
that Craigslist receives 200 scam complaints per month) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). While this number is small compared to the 
overall level of traffic on the site, according to its founder “the bad guys are 
persistent.” Id. 
 17. Verstein, supra note 9, at 11. 
 18. G. Jeffrey MacDonald, Web Sparks Person-to-Person Lending Around 
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well-known U.S. versions of such sites are Prosper Marketplace 
(Prosper.com) and LendingClub (www.lendingclub.com), which 
represent the “heartland of P2P.”19  
Prosper and LendingClub are the two most prominent online 
P2P sites in the United States, and both now use a similar 
business model.20 Prospective borrowers register with the platform 
and complete a loan application.21 Investors then review loan 
requests and determine which to fund.22 Investors do not make 
loans directly to borrowers.23 Once an investor chooses to fund a 
loan, a separate bank issues the loan to the borrower and then 
sells the loan to the P2P platform.24 The platform then issues a 
separate note to the investor with a return on the investment 
contingent upon the borrower repaying the original loan.25 Thus, 
the investor has made an investment in a note, not an actual loan, 
and hopes that the borrower will repay so that the note will be 
paid by the platform.  
LendingClub charges a fee for its services, and retrading of 
notes prior to maturity is permitted via a web-based platform 
created by a separate broker–dealer firm.26 The interest rate for a 
loan is set by the site according to its analysis of the borrower’s 
credit history, income, debt, and other factors.27 All borrowers 
must meet certain minimum credit criteria.28 Interest rates vary 
between 7% and 21%, and borrowers may request up to $25,000.29  
Prosper.com utilizes a similar model. Originally, the site used 
an online auction to “find investors willing to make loans to 
                                                                                                     
the World, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 24, 2007, at 13. 
 19. Verstein, supra note 9, at 6. 
 20. Id. 
 21. HOWARD M. FRIEDMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION IN CYBERSPACE § 5.03A 
(3d ed. 2010 supp.). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Pamela Yip, Person-to-Person Lending Is Networking Its Way Up, 
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 10, 2007, at 1D. 
 28. See Jean, supra note 7, at D1 (noting that LendingClub requires 
borrowers to have a FICO score of at least 660). 
 29. Id. 
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particular borrowers.”30 The lowest bidders (that is to say, those 
investors willing to extend credit at the lowest interest rates) 
would “win” the auction, and funds from those bidders would be 
pooled to extend loans.31 However, the site modified its approach in 
2010, removing from lenders the ability to determine interest 
rates; instead, the site sets an interest rate based on its own 
analysis of the applicant’s financial history.32 Prosper raised its 
minimum FICO score for borrowers from 520 to 640 in an effort to 
stem defaults.33 
A far more limited alternative is offered by a closed-end 
mutual fund, National Retail Fund, operated by Perpetuity, Inc.34 
Under this approach, investors diversify across consumer notes via 
purchase of mutual fund stakes.35 The consumer notes are based 
on loans made by the fund itself; investors can browse profiles of 
individual borrowers to see “why they are borrowing funds and 
‘how they are doing.’”36 The browsing of profiles is meant to make 
the site seem “hip” and connected to social networking, though the 
Fund in fact represents a far more traditional investment medium. 
A variety of other P2P lending sites also exist or have existed. 
Between 2001 and May 2011, at least fourteen companies have 
offered online P2P platforms in the United States.37 These sites 
have used a variety of models of P2P lending, including one that 
created direct links between individual borrowers and individual 
lenders without the use of a bank in the process.38 The alternative 
sites have been geared toward a variety of different segments of 
the lending market, such as small businesses, students, or those 
seeking loans to purchase a home.39 To date, none have received 
the attention that has been paid, both from a business and a 
regulatory sense, to the market leaders, Prosper and LendingClub. 
                                                                                                     
 30. FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, § 5.03A. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Manjoo, supra note 13, at G04. 
 33. Hunsberger, supra note 12. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 17 n.39. 
 38. Id. at 17. 
 39. Id. 
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On Prosper and LendingClub, typical borrowers are “seeking 
fairly small, unsecured loans for consumer purposes—such as 
consolidating debts, paying for home repairs, or financing personal, 
household, or family purchases.”40 Reviewing the borrowers on 
LendingClub, for instance, one of the authors found that the 
overwhelming share of the applicants sought debt consolidation 
loans.41 However, there were a few miscellaneous loan requests—a 
person with a credit score between 714 and 749 sought a $6,000 
five-year loan to purchase a Honda VTX 1800 Motorcycle, and a 
person with a 679–713 credit score sought $4,000 for an 
“engagement loan” to cover wedding expenses.42 
B. Historical and Contemporary Context for Peer-to-Peer Lending 
P2P lending is nothing new; indeed, non-institutional lending 
has long been a part of economic activity around the world. What 
is new about the sites discussed in this Article is their online 
dimension. Situating P2P lending within the broader context of 
noncommercial lending helps reveal both some of the reasons it is 
attractive to borrowers (and lenders), as well as some of the special 
risks that emerge due to the online nature of the new platforms. 
Commercial credit’s cost for borrowers is not simply the 
expense associated with the bank as “middle man.” Nontraditional 
lending is attractive for some borrowers, even if expensive, for at 
least two reasons. The first is its convenience. Take payday 
lenders, discussed elsewhere in this symposium issue,43 for 
                                                                                                     
 40. Id. at 10. 
 41. LendingClub Screen Shot (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 42. Id. Both loans had been close to fully funded (89% and 85% 
respectively). 
 43. See Paige Marta Skiba, Regulation of Payday Loans Misguided?, 69 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1023 (2012); Christopher L. Peterson, “Warning: Predatory 
Lender”—A Proposal for Candid Predatory Small Loan Ordinances, 69 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 893 (2012); William M. Webster, IV, Payday Loan Prohibitions: 
Protecting Financially Challenged Consumers or Pushing Them Over the Edge?, 
69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1051 (2012); Richard Hynes, Payday Lending, 
Bankruptcy, and Insolvency, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 607 (2012); Creola 
Johnson, Congress Protected the Troops: Can the New CFPB Protect Civilians 
from Payday Lending?, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 649 (2012); Nathalie Martin & 
Joshua Schwartz, The Alliance Between Payday Lenders and Tribes: Are Both 
496 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 485 (2012) 
instance. Though they charge seemingly excessive interest rates, 
payday lenders offer convenience when compared to other short-
term loan options.44 Surveys of payday loan customers reveal that 
the main value they assign to such options is convenience, with 
locations near home or work.45 In addition, commercial lending can 
subject potential borrowers to what might be referred to as moral 
interrogation. Walking into a bank, individuals with low incomes 
or credit defects may feel they are likely to be judged. By 
comparison, nontraditional lending can be less embarrassing46 and 
may even offer anonymity.47 
Person-to-person lending has long been part of the fringe 
economy. One need only think of borrowing from loan sharks or 
lending gas money to one’s college roommate to realize how 
common person-to-person lending actually is. Most people, if not 
all, have resorted to some form of person-to-person lending in their 
lives.  
With that said, P2P lending takes a remarkable variety of 
forms, including some that are quite formalized. An examination of 
three of these forms demonstrates just how varied person-to-
person lending can be. The first is the “rotating credit association,” 
“RCA,” or “ROSCA.” The RCA is the “basis for the peer lending 
methodology.”48 The Chinese hui, Japanese ko or tanomoshi, 
Korean kye, Mexican tanda, and Nigerian esusu are all forms of 
this kind of lending.49 In Cantonese-speaking China, they have 
been around for perhaps 1,800 years,50 and in this country, they 
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2008, at 8. 
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824 n.154 (2007). 
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at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/community-development/publications/discussion-
papers/discussionpaper-ROSCAs.pdf. 
 50. Id. at 6. 
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remain prevalent among certain immigrant communities. One-half 
of California’s Japanese immigrants had participated in some form 
of rotating credit association according to a 1960s survey,51 and as 
late as the 1980s, more than 80% of Korean immigrants in Los 
Angeles had participated in RCAs.52 
An RCA is formed upon a “core of participants” who make 
“regular contributions to a fund which” are then pooled and “given 
to each contributor in rotation.”53 They differ in terms of size, 
criteria for membership, manner in which order of payouts are 
made, organizational structure, and the sanction for violations, but 
they share the essential characteristic of being an informal credit 
institution lending small lump sums.54  
RCAs rely on social trust to ensure repayment of lent funds.55 
Inevitably, some members will default (quitting the RCA before 
their “take” has been recouped through periodic payments). This 
can produce effective interest rates as high as 30%,56 well above 
those charged by commercial lenders (and authorized by usury 
laws), even for “zero-interest” RCAs.57 In other RCAs, early 
recipients of payouts “bid” for interest rates they are willing to pay 
for the privilege of early receipt—and such rates can be as high as 
24%.58 These suggest relatively high transaction costs in 
comparison to traditional credit. Still, RCAs provide a means to 
access credit for those unable to access it due to discrimination, 
immigration status, or language barriers. Moreover, RCAs provide 
                                                                                                     
 51. Id. at 22. 
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convenience because “like numbers gambling syndicates, RCAs 
circumvent the slow, unfriendly, and bureaucratic channels of 
banks.”59 Like P2P lending, RCAs stand in an ambiguous legal 
position; courts sometimes conflate them with unlicensed 
lotteries,60 and practices commonly associated with RCAs, like the 
failure to report interest income or interest rates exceeding levels 
permitted under usury laws, contribute to a widespread belief that 
they are unlawful.61 
A second well-established form of P2P lending is a numbers 
racket, popular at various points among African-Americans in 
Harlem and factory-line workers in Detroit, among others. A 
numbers racket depends on the identification of a number, the 
appearance of which could be predicted but with values that could 
not. For instance, an early numbers racket was based on two 
figures released each morning in New York City—the total daily 
clearances among a certain group of banks and the Federal 
Reserve balance.62 The winning number would combine, for 
instance, the second and third digits of the “clearings” figure with 
the third digit of the Fed balance.63 
A person could “bet” anything from a few pennies to a few 
dollars on a number, with odds of winning 1 in 1,000 but payoffs of 
600 to 1.64 Langston Hughes called the numbers racket “the 
salvation of Harlem, its Medicare, and its Black Draught, its 666, 
its little liver pills, its vitamins, its aspirins, and its analgesic balm 
combined.”65  
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Blackdraft and 666 were popular laxatives. Id. Hughes’s statement was 
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Dismissing a number racket as a form of illegal gambling 
would be a mistake; the “whole enterprise” has an “essentially 
economic nature.”66 Those running the racket were referred to as 
“bankers,” and those who played as “investors.”67 Those who 
played did not think of themselves as gamblers; they took the term 
“investing” literally.68 Hitting the winning number was not the 
equivalent of today’s Powerball lottery, where a winner is set for 
life.69 Instead, it would provide a windfall “that allowed debts to be 
paid off.”70 Investing a few coins a day made sense, even in the face 
of long odds (the expected rate of return being slightly above one 
dollar for every two played).71 According to retired NYPD detective 
Rufus Shatzberg, the numbers racket was a “financial institution” 
that “substituted for mainstream organizations that could not and 
would not provide financial services in poor communities.”72 Due to 
a “vacuum where there were few banks, credit associations, loan 
and realty enterprises, numbers gambling emerged [and] became a 
source of capital and, ironically, a means of savings, a device for 
personally accumulating some resources.”73 
The primary appeal of the numbers game was its convenience. 
Numbers “runners” made circuits of their customers, who “thus do 
not have to go out of their way to bet.”74 Numbers stations were 
“located in newsstands, pool halls, cigar stores, and groceries”—
locations people visited for other reasons on a typical day.75 Even 
those with traditional savings accounts found “it convenient to lay 
a dollar on a number while at the barber shop rather than risk 
making no ‘investment’ at all in the day.”76 The numbers rackets 
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have now “almost completely disappeared” thanks to competition 
from government-sanctioned lotteries.77 
A third form of  noncommercial lending is a hybrid between 
P2P and institutional lending. Pawnbroking has been around since 
the 1850s or 1860s. A pawnbroker takes personal property from 
borrowers as security for cash loans; if the loan is not repaid, the 
pawnbroker resells the item held as security.78 One nineteenth 
century commentator referred to pawn shops as the “salvation of 
the wage-earner in bad times.”79 Since its early days, unlike the 
illicit numbers racket or the shadowy rotating credit association, 
pawnbroking has been subject to fairly tight regulation.80 A 
pawnbroker needs little overhead and administration,81 and the 
simple nature of the transaction makes it a rapid way to obtain 
credit and minimize transactions costs. Pawnbroking thus provides 
“essential access to credit for people experiencing financial shocks 
who may have nowhere else to turn.”82 
These three examples provide insight into the emergence of 
online P2P lending. Like each of these forms of nontraditional 
lending, convenience is a primary selling point for online P2P sites. 
No physical appearance at a bank is necessary; one can apply for a 
loan on a laptop computer while sitting on the couch. 
On the other hand, some concerns should arise as a result of 
the divergence between online P2P and these other forms of 
informal credit. There is no family, cultural or group tie-ins with 
online P2P that would enforce repayment, as in the case of RCAs. 
There is also no face-to-face interaction, as in the case of 
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pawnbroking or numbers rackets, which might increase the moral 
hazard associated with online P2P lending.  
Online P2P transactions also involve a level of “cleanliness,” 
thanks to the Internet, that might not be associated with 
predecessor forms of informal lending. The seeming sterility of the 
transaction might reduce the moral sanction associated with such 
lending/borrowing and perhaps increase adverse selection. When a 
potential borrower turns to a pawn shop or a payday lender, she 
must appear personally and may, whether due to the aesthetic 
environment or perceptions of social stigma attached to such 
borrowing, rethink the need for a loan. By contrast, an online P2P 
loan applicant can submit a request for a loan entirely 
electronically. The lack of channeling of potential borrowers might 
mean that those who turn to online P2P have not adequately 
thought through their need for a loan or the likelihood they will be 
able to pay it back. 
C. The Emerging Importance of Online Peer-to-Peer Lending 
Online P2P lending is hot. The Harvard Business Review 
called it a “breakthrough idea for 2009.”83 In 2011, the Wall Street 
Journal listed Prosper as one of the top 50 “next big things,”84 and 
Lending Club won a “webby” award.85 Two reasons explain this 
development, one of a positive nature and one negative. The 
positive driving force of P2P’s popularity is the emergence of “Web 
2.0” applications on the Internet. The negative driving force was 
the near collapse—and certainly significant contraction—of the 
U.S. consumer and business credit markets in 2008. 
The first force driving online P2P, a positive one, is the 
development of Web 2.0 businesses. The term “Web 2.0” was 
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popularized86 by book publisher Tim O’Reilly to describe a second 
generation of Internet offering, “which relies on collective 
intelligence and action from the bottom up.”87 First-generation web 
activity, or “Web 1.0,” treated users as passive, presenting them 
with information but declining to involve them actively in the 
generation of web content.88 For users of Web 1.0, the 
“characteristic activity was surfing static Internet pages.”89 
Web 2.0, by contrast, emphasizes the “architecture of 
participation.”90 Web sites have become organic, developing as 
users (rather than site planners and developers) express their 
preferences. Authoritarian web developers have given way to the 
“wisdom-of-the-crowds,”91 in which the “harnessing [of] collective 
intelligence”92 is accomplished through the use of new software 
tools. 
Web 1.0 was EncyclopediaBrittannica.com;93 Web 2.0 is 
Wikipedia,94 which relies on the inputs of users to create 
encyclopedia entries. Web 1.0 was askjeeves.com; Web 2.0 is 
Google,95 which traces the behavior of search engine users to 
provide inputs to the site’s algorithms. Web 1.0 was ofoto, where 
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individuals could print their photos, while Web 2.0 is the photo-
sharing site Flickr. 
Online P2P lending offers the Web 2.0 alternative to Web 1.0 
lending platforms such as e-loan, Lending Tree, and the like. On 
those sites, potential borrowers are passive. They provide 
information to a central website, which in turn offers potential 
lenders the chance to finance customers’ loans. Web 2.0 P2P 
lending harnesses the collective intelligence of potential lenders, at 
least in theory, to identify which borrowers will receive loans.  
However, the sites as they exist now do not fully exploit the 
potential of Web 2.0 interfaces to harness collective intelligence. 
Investors are unable, for instance, to share information or 
perspectives on a particular borrower or their request—for 
instance, by wiki (is a Honda motorcycle the best choice for an 
investor with X credit score?).96 Of course, one should remember 
that P2P lending is not a static industry that uses a single model, 
and along with the rest of Web 2.0, P2P lending will continue to 
morph and evolve. 
The second driving force behind the growth in P2P lending has 
been the credit market contraction following the financial 
instability of 2008. In 2008, liquidity crises at several major 
financial institutions led to widespread fears that “credit markets, 
and in turn the global economy, would completely seize up, causing 
an economic catastrophe unparalleled in modern history.”97 Most 
readers are no doubt familiar with the unparalleled federal 
bailouts that followed. 
In the wake of the crisis, even after the string of bailouts 
secured the health of most remaining affected institutions, 
consumer credit remained far more difficult to obtain than it had 
before. Although the financial crisis had its roots in the high 
default risk associated with the subprime mortgage lending 
industry, consumer credit constricted across the board. Total 
consumer lending fell by 6.10% between January 2009 and March 
2010, “accelerating into a contraction the like of which has not 
been seen before.”98  
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Lenders tightened guidelines on access to mortgages and 
home-equity loans. Particularly for high-risk individuals seeking 
unsecured debt-consolidation loans, the result has been difficulty 
obtaining access to credit via traditional sources. Even some 
students have turned to other sources after being turned away by 
traditional sources of student loans.99 This has driven borrowers 
toward emerging alternatives, including online P2P lending 
sites.100 
The pressure from credit market challenges did not solely 
affect individual borrowers. Even small businesses have been 
forced to seek alternative means to obtain credit, and some have 
turned to P2P sites.101 P2P has become one of the “fringe” banking 
options that has risen in importance as higher-risk borrowers have 
been turned away by increasingly risk-adverse traditional lending 
institutions.102 
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P2P lending has also allowed capital to flow to communities 
that were underserved by the credit markets even prior to the 
retraction of those markets in 2008. Individuals who previously 
were mired in debt and for whom payday lending may have 
seemed the only option have, thanks to online P2P, been able to 
consolidate their loans, pay off debts, and improve their credit 
scores.103 P2P lending has allowed capital to flow into economically 
depressed communities and created new opportunities for 
community development and economic growth.104 Moreover, P2P 
lending has not only fueled domestic economic development, it has 
also fueled economic development abroad.105 Sites such as Kiva 
(www.kiva.com) specialize in lending internationally to support 
entrepreneurship and economic growth in developing countries.106  
D. The Risks of Peer-to-Peer Lending 
Despite the benefits of P2P lending, it also raises substantial 
concerns. P2P lending shares all of the risks associated with 
traditional “brick and mortar” lending including lending fraud, 
identity theft, money laundering, consumer privacy and data-
protection violations, and terrorism financing.107 These risks are 
then married to and amplified by the anonymity and ubiquity of 
the Internet. 
The model for P2P lending used by the major for-profit lending 
platforms also has a variety of problematic characteristics. First, 
the information supplied by borrowers often is not verified, and 
when the information is verified, it often proves inaccurate.108 As a 
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result, lenders using the sites face difficulty determining a 
borrower’s actual creditworthiness.109 Second, the credit ratings 
assigned by the platforms may not accurately predict how loans 
will perform because platforms have a limited amount of historical 
loan-performance data.110 Third, the returns on the notes that the 
platforms sell to individual lenders are based entirely on 
repayment by the individual borrowers and are not secured by any 
collateral or guaranteed by any third party.111 Fourth, in the event 
of default by the borrowers, lenders are dependent on the P2P 
lending platforms and their designees for collecting on the 
defaulted loan, which the platforms are notoriously bad at doing. 
For example, as of February 2009, Prosper Marketplace had 
recovered just over $800,000 of the $39.4 million it had charged off 
in default.112 The lenders using such sites have no independent 
means of pursuing collection on unpaid loans. Fifth, investments 
made by individual lenders are significantly less liquid than many 
other forms of investment because many of the loans are for three 
to five year terms.113 Moreover, some platforms restrict the sale 
and transfer of loans to other individuals, except to lenders on that 
particular platform.114 Sixth, a high degree of uncertainty exists as 
to what would occur in the event that a platform became 
bankrupt.115 Seventh, because models of P2P lending and the 
regulatory scheme associated with it continue to evolve, a high 
degree of uncertainty exists as to how P2P lending will evolve in 
the future.116 
Because the commonly used model for P2P lending is riddled 
with these risks, P2P lending platforms have had a rocky start. 
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Sites have experienced high default rates, which “rival or exceed 
those of credit-card borrowers at big banks.”117 During Prosper 
Marketplace’s first three years of operation, approximately one-
third of the loans that it helped originate ended in default, and 
investors lost on average 4.95% annually during that time.118 In 
addition, as of this writing, neither Prosper Marketplace nor the 
LendingClub had yet turned a profit.119 
As a result, online P2P lending, which at first appears to be a 
“golden goose,” may turn individual lenders into “pigeons.” In 
LendingClub’s defense, its prospectus, which exceeds 100 pages, 
states: “The Notes [, i.e. loans made via its site], are highly risky 
and speculative. Investing in the Notes should be considered only 
by persons who can afford the loss of their entire investment.”120 
And, in Prosper Marketplace’s defense, its prospectus, which 
exceeds 120 pages, includes the same language verbatim.121 Still, 
the chance of misapprehension of the risk and improper 
investment portfolio diversification by lenders in P2P lending 
transactions remains exceedingly high. 
As a result, the myriad of benefits of P2P lending are matched 
with a myriad of risks for borrowers, lenders, lending platforms, 
and society at large. A robust regulatory structure on par with the 
regulatory structure used for traditional lending is needed to 
mitigate these risks. 
                                                                                                     
 117. See Hunsberger, supra note 12. 
 118. See Lieber, supra note 108. 
 119. PROSPER MARKETPLACE, INC., 2011 FORM 10-K, at 63, available at 
http://marketbrief.com/prosper-marketplace-inc/10k/annual-report/2011/3/30/77 
86716/filing?secwatch#item6selectedfindata12310201 (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) 
(“We have incurred operating losses since our inception and we anticipate that 
we will continue to incur net losses through at least 2011.”); LENDINGCLUB 
CORP., PROSPECTUS DATED JUNE 10, 2011, at 23, available at 
https://www.lendingclub.com/ extdata/Clean_As_Filed_20110610.pdf (“We have 
not been profitable since our inception.”); Hunsberger, supra note 12. 
 120. LENDINGCLUB CORP., supra note 119, at 70. 
 121. PROPSER MARKETPLACE, INC., PROSPECTUS DATED JULY 14, 2011, at 47 
available at http://www.prosper.com/Downloads/Legal/Prosper_Prospectus_ 
2011-07-14.pdf. 
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III. The Current Regulatory Regime for Online Peer-to-Peer 
Lending 
The current regulatory structure for online P2P lending 
involves multiple overseeing agencies. Responsibility for 
regulating such lending potentially falls within the purview of a 
wide variety of federal and state regulators, including the new 
CFPB, the Federal Trade Commission, the United States 
Department of Justice, the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission, various federal bank regulators, and the state 
counterparts of all these entities.122 Two things inhibit the 
development of a coherent regulatory regime for online P2P 
lending. First, such lending is a relatively new phenomenon that 
has only recently attracted public attention, and therefore, 
regulators are still trying to puzzle through its implications. 
Second, a variety of models exist for P2P lending, and models 
continue to be created and evolve, which means that developing a 
single coherent regulatory regime for P2P lending will be 
extraordinarily difficult. 
Because banks are involved in the most prominent model of 
P2P lending, such lending is already the subject of significant 
regulation. As previously explained, the major P2P lending sites in 
the United States, Prosper Marketplace and LendingClub, use a 
model in which a bank originates loans to individual borrowers, 
and notes are then sold to individual lenders with payment on the 
notes being contingent upon repayment of the underlying loan. 
Because a bank is involved in the lending process, both companies 
admit that a myriad of federal statutes apply directly or indirectly 
to their lending activities.123 These statutes include the Bank 
Secrecy Act,124 the Electronic Fund Transfer Act,125 the Electronic 
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act,126 the Equal 
                                                                                                     
 122. See GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 3–7 (discussing the myriad of federal 
and state regulators that potentially share some responsibility for regulating 
P2P lending). 
 123. See GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 33 tbl.2 (listing federal lending and 
consumer protection laws that officials from LendingClub and Prosper 
Marketplace admitted are applicable to P2P lending). 
 124. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b–31, 1951–59 (2006); 31 U.S.C. §§ 321, 5311–14, 
5316–22 (2006). 
 125. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693–1693r (2006). 
 126. Id.§§ 7001–7006, 7021, 7031. 
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Credit Opportunity Act,127 the Fair Credit Reporting Act,128 the 
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,129 the Federal Trade 
Commission Act,130 the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Financial 
Modernization Act,131 the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act,132 and 
the Truth in Lending Act.133  
With that said, federal and state securities regulators have 
likely taken the most aggressive action in regulating P2P lending. 
All regulators who have confronted the issue agree that the notes 
in the prominent model for P2P lending are securities.  
A. Federal Securities Regulation and Peer-to-Peer Lending 
The United States Securities and Exchange Commission has 
taken an aggressive role in regulating P2P lending because the 
most commonly used model of such lending involves the offer, 
sale, and purchase of securities. On the Prosper and LendingClub 
sites, banks issue loans to individual borrowers, and notes are 
then sold to individual lenders with payment on the notes being 
contingent upon repayment of the underlying loan.134 The notes 
that are being offered, sold, and purchased in this model 
constitute securities under both the Securities Act of 1933 
(Securities Act)135 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(Exchange Act).136 Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act137 and 
                                                                                                     
 127. Id. §§ 1691–1691f. 
 128. Id. §§ 1681–1681x. 
 129. Id. §§ 1692–1692p. 
 130. Id. §§ 41–58. 
 131. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 12, 15, 16, and 18 U.S.C.). 
 132. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 501–596 (2006). 
 133. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f (2006). 
 134. See supra notes 20–25 and accompanying text. 
 135. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006). 
 136. Id. §§ 78a–78pp. 
 137. See id. § 77b(a)(1)   
The term “security” means any note, stock, treasury stock, security 
future, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of 
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-
trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, 
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, 
certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, 
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Section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act138 provide definitions of a 
“security.” Because both sections include within the definition of a 
security the terms “investment contracts” and “notes,”139 their 
applicability to online P2P lending is identical. Importantly, if the 
notes in online P2P transactions are either “investment contracts” 
or “notes” under federal securities law, then the notes in P2P 
transactions are securities, even if they qualify as only one of the 
two classes of securities.140 
The notes used in the most common model of P2P lending 
constitute securities for purposes of federal securities law because 
they are investment contracts. In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,141 the 
Supreme Court established the test for identifying an investment 
                                                                                                     
gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or 
privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of 
securities (including any interest therein or based on the value 
thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on 
a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in 
general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a “security”, 
or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim 
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to 
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing. 
 138. See id. § 78c(a)(10)  
The term “security” means any note, stock, treasury stock, security 
future, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any 
profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty 
or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or 
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust 
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, any put, call, straddle, 
option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or 
index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the 
value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered 
into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or 
in general, any instrument commonly known as a “security”; or any 
certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim 
certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or 
purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any 
note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker’s acceptance which has a 
maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, 
exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of 
which is likewise limited. 
 139. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006) (“The term 
‘security’ means any note . . . [or] investment contract.”); Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2006) (same). 
 140. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 64 (1990) (determining that 
both “investment contracts” and “notes” qualify as securities). 
 141. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
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contract under federal securities law.142 In that case, W.J. Howey 
Company (Howey) sold tracts of land containing citrus groves to 
the public.143 Potential customers were offered both a contract for 
the sale of the land and a contract for servicing the citrus groves.144 
The service contract was to be performed by Howey-in-the-Hills 
Service, Inc. (Howey-in-the-Hills), a corporation with the same 
management and ownership as Howey.145 Although the purchasers 
of the land contract could arrange for other service companies to 
tend their groves, Howey-in-the-Hills serviced approximately 85% 
of the land that was sold.146 The service contracts had a ten-year 
duration without option of cancellation and gave Howey-in-the-
Hills “full and complete” possession of the land that was being 
serviced.147 Howey-in-the-Hills pooled fruit from all of the land 
that it serviced and then made an allocation of the net profits to 
the land owners, most of whom were not residents of Florida, 
where the groves were located.148 
The Supreme Court held that Howey and Howey-in-the-Hills 
were offering and selling securities under the federal securities 
laws because they were offering and selling investment 
contracts.149 The Court reached this holding by examining the 
definition of a security in Section 2(1)—now 2(a)(1)—of the 
Securities Act.150 After noting that the definition includes the term 
“investment contract,” the Court explained that the term 
“investment contract” is not defined in the federal securities laws, 
                                                                                                     
 142. See id. at 298–99 (“[A]n investment contract for purposes of the 
Securities Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person 
invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from 
the efforts of the promoter or a third party.”). 
 143. Id. at 295. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 296. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See id. at 299–300 (concluding that the “transactions in this case 
clearly involve investment contracts” and thus holding that Howey and Howey-
in-the-Hills were offering and selling securities). 
 150. See id. at 297 (“The legal issue in this case turns upon a determination 
of whether, under the circumstances, the land sales contract, the warranty deed 
and the service contract together constitute an ‘investment contract’ within the 
meaning of [section] 2(1).”). 
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but that the term was commonly used in many state “blue sky” 
laws and broadly construed by state courts prior to the passage of 
the Securities Act and Exchange Act.151 The Supreme Court 
adopted this broad approach and determined that the test for an 
investment contract is “whether the scheme involves an 
investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come 
solely from the efforts of others.”152 The Court then found that the 
land and service contracts were investment contracts because 
Howey and Howey-in-the-Hills were offering and selling the 
opportunity to invest money in a common enterprise to grow citrus 
fruit that they fully operated and managed.153 The Court also 
found it irrelevant that the purchasers of the land could have 
found someone else to service the citrus groves, concluding that the 
test for a security was still met because Howey and Howey-in-the-
Hills were “offer[ing] the essential ingredients of an investment 
contract.”154 
The Howey test is usually broken down by courts into three 
distinct elements.155 First, a common enterprise must exist that 
sufficiently intertwines investors’ interests with those of other 
investors and/or the promoters of the investment.156 All courts 
have held that horizontal commonality, which exists when a pool of 
investors is created whose fortunes are tied to the overall success 
of the venture, satisfies the Howey test.157 Some courts have held 
that vertical commonality, which focuses on the relationship 
between the investor and promoters alone, satisfies the Howey 
test.158 Second, for an investment contract to exist, an investor 
must also have an expectation of profits based upon the 
                                                                                                     
 151. Id. at 298. 
 152. Id. at 301. 
 153. See id. at 299 (finding that the “transactions in this case clearly 
involve[d] investment contracts” because “[Howey and Howey-in-the-Hills were] 
offering an opportunity to contribute money and to share in the profits of a 
citrus fruit enterprise managed and partly owned [by them]”). 
 154. Id. at 301. 
 155. See MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 28 (Rev. 5th ed. 2009) 
(“The Howey analysis applied by the courts in these cases can usually be broken 
down into three issues.”).  
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 36. 
 158. See id. (noting that courts disagree as to whether “vertical 
commonality” is sufficient to meet Howey’s common enterprise requirement). 
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investment.159 Third, the expectation of profit must come solely 
from the efforts of others.160 
The notes in the most commonly used model of P2P lending 
constitute investment contracts. First, a common enterprise exists. 
Horizontal commonality is likely present in the note-based model 
of P2P lending because a pool of investors is created who want to 
lend money to a pool of lenders. A counterargument might be that 
horizontal commonality does not exist in the note-based model of 
P2P lending because such lending is connecting individual lenders 
with individual borrowers. However, because investors are paying 
fees that support both the bank and P2P lending platform, a court 
is likely to hold that horizontal commonality does exist in the note-
based model. Moreover, an individual borrower on these sites 
receives funds tied to the investment of multiple “lenders,” so each 
loan is in a real sense a common enterprise. 
Even if horizontal commonality does not exist, vertical 
commonality may also meet the common enterprise requirement of 
the Howey test.161 Although not all courts allow vertical 
commonality to satisfy the Howey test, a strong argument exists 
for allowing it in the case of note-based P2P lending because 
individual investors are not linked to a single issuer but are linked 
to an individual borrower, a bank, and a lending platform through 
a P2P lending transaction.  
Howey’s second element, the expectation of profits, is also met. 
Individuals and entities use for-profit P2P lending sites as a means 
of investing money and gaining a return. There is no plausible 
argument—at least in the case of for-profit online P2P (as opposed 
to microfinance/development P2P)—that a profit element is not 
central.  
Howey’s third element is also likely satisfied because 
investors’ expectation of profits in note-based P2P lending is based 
solely on the efforts of others. The investor relies on the individual 
borrower to pay the loan and the bank and the P2P lending site to 
collect from the borrower, pay the lender, and institute default 
proceedings in the event that the borrower fails to pay. Current 
                                                                                                     
 159. Id. at 28. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See STEINBERG, supra note 155, at 36 (stating that some courts have 
determined that vertical commonality alone satisfies the Howey test). 
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models of online P2P lending, unlike even the investment at issue 
in Howey, provide no alternative to having the sites service the 
loan and handle collections. An investor is unable to retain an 
alternative agent to collect on an unpaid loan. 
Although it seems clear that the Howey test for an investment 
contract is satisfied, investments in online P2P sites are also likely 
securities under federal law because they qualify as “notes.” In 
Reves v. Ernst & Young,162 the Supreme Court established the test 
for what constitutes a note within the definition of a security under 
federal securities law.163 In that case, the Farmer’s Cooperative of 
Arkansas and Oklahoma (the Co-Op) sold promissory notes that 
were payable on demand by the holder in order to support its 
business operations.164 The notes paid a variable rate of return 
that was adjusted monthly to keep it above the rate paid by other 
local financial institutions.165 After the Co-Op declared 
bankruptcy, the plaintiffs in the case brought a class action 
against Arthur Young & Co. (Arthur Young), the predecessor to 
Ernst & Young, claiming that Arthur Young had intentionally 
ignored generally accepted accounting principles in its outside 
audit of the Co-Op to inflate the Co-Op’s assets and net worth.166 
As a result, the plaintiffs asserted that Arthur Young had violated 
various antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act and Arkansas 
state securities law.167 The plaintiffs won a $6.1 million judgment 
in the district court, which was reversed by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.168 
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit and held that 
the notes in the case constituted securities under both the 
Securities Act and Exchange Act.169 The Court began by examining 
Congress’s intent in defining the term “security” under federal 
                                                                                                     
 162. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990). 
 163. See id. at 64–65 (adopting the “family resemblance test” whereby a note 
is presumed to be a security unless it “‘bear[s] a strong family resemblance’ to 
an item on the judicially crafted list of exceptions, or [the issuer] convinces the 
court to add a new instrument to the list”) (citations omitted). 
 164. Id. at 58. 
 165. Id. at 58–59. 
 166. Id. at 59. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 73. 
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securities law.170 The Court noted that Congress “enacted a 
definition of ‘security’ sufficiently broad to encompass virtually any 
instrument that might be sold as an investment.”171 The Court 
then adopted a “family resemblance” test for differentiating 
whether a particular note was an investment and covered by 
federal securities law or whether a note was commercial in nature 
and not covered.172 Application of the “family resemblance” test 
begins with a rebuttable presumption that every note is a 
security.173 This presumption can be rebutted if the note at issue 
bears a resemblance to certain judicially created categories of 
instruments that are commonly referred to as “notes” but 
nonetheless fall outside the definition of a security under federal 
securities laws.174 These judicially created categories of notes that 
are exempt from federal securities law include notes that are 
delivered in consumer financing, notes that are secured by 
mortgages on homes, and notes that evidence loans by commercial 
banks for current operations of businesses.175  
The Supreme Court also created a list of factors for 
determining whether courts should exclude additional categories of 
notes from the federal definition of security.176 First, the 
motivations of the buyer and seller must be assessed.177 If the 
buyer is primarily interested in profit and the seller seeks to raise 
capital for business purposes, then the note is likely a security 
under federal securities law.178 Second, the plan of distribution of 
the instrument must be examined.179 If the plan of distribution 
includes the creation of common trading for investment or 
speculation, then the note is likely a security.180 Third, the 
                                                                                                     
 170. Id. at 60–61. 
 171. Id. at 61. 
 172. Id. at 64–65. 
 173. Id. at 65. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. (citing Exch. Nat’l Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 
1126, 1138 (2nd Cir. 1976)). 
 176. See id. at 66–67 (stating four factors to be used in determining whether 
a “note” meets the federal definition of a security). 
 177. Id. at 66. 
 178. Id.  
 179. Id. 
 180. See id. (“[W]e examine the ‘plan of distribution’ of the instrument . . . to 
516 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 485 (2012) 
expectation of the public must be analyzed.181 If the public would 
view the note at issue as a security, then the note likely is a 
security, even if the realities of the transaction might suggest 
otherwise.182 Fourth, the risks created by the note at issue must be 
assessed.183 For example, a court will be substantially less likely to 
hold that a note is a security if another regulatory regime 
significantly reduces the risk.184  
The notes in the commonly used model of P2P lending are 
securities under the Reves test. The default presumption is that 
any note is a security, although this presumption can be rebutted 
if the notes fall within certain judicially defined categories of notes 
that are not securities.185 The notes in the most commonly used 
model of P2P lending are unlikely to fall within any of the 
currently existing categories of notes that are exempt from federal 
securities law for two reasons. First, online P2P lending has only 
gained the attention of the public within the past half decade, and 
courts have yet to address whether the notes used in the most 
common model of such lending are securities. Second, the notes in 
the most common model of P2P lending are investments, while the 
notes in the judicially created categories of notes exempt from 
federal securities law are all consumer or commercial in nature. A 
major distinction between these notes and excluded consumer 
notes is that the person providing funds associated with the P2P 
note is not also seeking to facilitate the sale of real or personal 
property to the borrower. 
In addition, courts are unlikely to hold that the notes in the 
most common model of P2P lending should be recognized as a new 
category of notes that do not constitute securities. All of the factors 
for creating new categories of notes that do not constitute 
                                                                                                     
determine whether it is an instrument in which there is ‘common trading for 
speculation or investment.’”). 
 181. Id.  
 182. Id. 
 183. See id. at 67 (“Finally, we examine whether some factor such as the 
existence of another regulatory scheme significantly reduces the risk of the 
instrument, thereby rendering application of the Securities Acts unnecessary.”). 
 184. Id.  
 185. See id. (“A note is presumed to be a ‘security,’ and that presumption 
may be rebutted only by a showing that the note bears a strong resemblance (in 
terms of the four factors we have identified) to one of the enumerated categories 
of instrument.”). 
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securities implicitly ask the same question: Is this note an 
investment?186 Although the loans that are made by the bank to 
the individual borrowers in the most common model of P2P 
lending may not be investments, the securitized loans (i.e., the 
notes) that are sold to the individual lender definitely are 
investments. Arguing that the notes that are sold in P2P lending 
transactions to individual lenders are exempt from federal 
securities law would be similar to arguing the mortgage-backed 
securities that were at the heart of the most recent financial crisis 
are not securities. The concept behind both is the same, and a 
court is extraordinarily unlikely to rule that either is exempt from 
federal securities law. 
Moreover, since the SEC and other regulatory agencies have 
deemed these notes securities, administrative deference would also 
apply to this issue. On November 24, 2008, the SEC issued a cease-
and-desist order against Prosper Marketplace for selling 
unregistered securities.187 The SEC alleged that Prosper 
Marketplace had violated Section 5(a) and (c) of the Securities Act 
by offering and selling securities without either filing an effective 
registration statement or having an exemption from 
registration.188 The SEC determined that the notes at issue in the 
action were securities by applying the Howey test for investment 
contracts and the Reves test for notes covered by the Securities Act 
and Exchange Act.189 Put another way, the SEC employed an 
approach similar to the analysis discussed above. 
An even stronger argument that the notes in the most 
common model of P2P lending are securities is based upon the fact 
that the major for-profit P2P lending platforms have begun 
registering the notes that they sell as securities. At the time that 
the SEC issued its cease-and-desist order, Prosper Marketplace 
had already submitted a settlement offer, which the SEC had 
                                                                                                     
 186. See id. at 66–67 (stating four factors to be used to determine whether a 
note qualifies as a security). 
 187. Order Instituting Cease-And-Desist Proceedings against Prosper 
Marketplace, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8984, 94 SEC Docket 1913 (Nov. 
24, 2008) (cease-and-desist order). 
 188. Id. at *2. 
 189. See id. at *4–6 (applying both the Howey investment contract analysis 
and the Reves note analysis). 
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accepted.190 Although the Order states that Prosper Marketplace 
had entered the settlement agreement “without admitting or 
denying the findings [in the Order], except as to the Commission’s 
jurisdiction over it and the subject matter of [the] proceedings,”191 
one can hardly imagine any circumstance under which Prosper 
Marketplace would sacrifice the time and expense of registration, 
unless it believed the notes that it was offering and selling were 
securities subject to the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. Both 
Prosper Marketplace and LendingClub currently register the notes 
that they sell to individual lenders as securities.192 Because 
Prosper Marketplace and Lending Club have a strong financial 
incentive to avoid the costs of registration by finding any valid 
argument that the notes are not securities, questioning whether 
the notes are subject to federal securities law seems little more 
than an academic exercise. 
One author, in a forthcoming article, has argued that the SEC 
could have decided that the notes sold in the note-based model of 
P2P lending should not be deemed securities.193 In The 
Misregulation of Person-to-Person Lending,194 Andrew Verstein 
argues that policy favors exempting P2P from securities regulation 
and that “[g]iven P2P’s potentially tremendous benefits, an ideal 
regulator would strive to expand and improve the industry.”195 
Vernstein’s article is both thoroughly researched and well written. 
All of the arguments he makes are plausible and have some 
grounding in existing law. 
The authors of this piece, however, dispute several aspects of 
Verstein’s analysis. First, he begins with the conclusion that online 
P2P should be allowed to develop unfettered by securities 
regulation.196 Beginning with this policy conclusion weakens his 
                                                                                                     
 190. Id. at *1. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See Verstein, supra note 9, at 25 (stating that after the SEC’s cease-
and-desist order against Prosper Marketplace that most P2P platforms 
registered with the SEC). 
 193. See id. at 62–67 (arguing that “P2P notes should be removed from the 
scope of the Securities Acts”). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 24. 
 196. See id. at 26 (stating that “SEC regulation of P2P lending was both 
unnecessary and harmful”). 
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case that existing law could have permitted the SEC to issue a 
finding that online P2P instruments are not securities.197 He 
chides the SEC for sticking to law in its cease-and-desist order 
against Prosper Marketplace for selling unregistered securities 
because the SEC “did not offer policy justifications for [its] 
positions.”198 The starting point in regulating a new financial 
product, however, is what the law says, not what one wishes policy 
would be. Although Verstein does make some valid points in his 
analysis of the Howey and Reves tests,199 his analysis runs counter 
to the conclusions of regulators and the admissions of the industry 
that securities are being sold to individual lenders in P2P 
transactions. 
Verstein does admit that his argument that P2P notes should 
be legally exempt from securities law may not be convincing.200 He 
ultimately advocates that P2P notes should be exempt from the 
federal securities acts.201 
As the GAO pointed out in its report, however, even if a new 
Congressional enactment excluded online P2P from the scope of 
federal securities regulation, state regulators could still decide the 
sites offered securities under state law.202 The next section 
discusses the challenge online P2P has faced in the states, a 
regulatory concern Verstein does not engage. 
B. State Securities Regulation and Peer-to-Peer Lending 
State regulators have also been extremely active in the 
regulation of P2P lending. States have taken three basic 
approaches to regulating P2P sites. First, some states have 
prohibited online P2P sites from soliciting “investors” (lenders) in 
their states. Other states have allowed the sites to operate within 
                                                                                                     
 197. See id. at 27–34 (arguing that the SEC overreached when determining 
that online P2P instruments qualified as investment contracts or notes). 
 198. Id. at 25. 
 199. See id. at 27–34 (analyzing the online P2P instruments under the 
Howey and Reves tests). 
 200. See id. at 26 (stating that “it is plausible that P2P notes were either 
‘investment contracts’ or ‘notes’ for the purposes of the Securities Acts”). 
 201. See id. at 62 (“P2P notes should be removed from the scope of the 
federal Securities Acts.”). 
 202. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 44. 
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their borders according to the business models provided by those 
sites. A third approach has been to authorize such sites but limit 
“investment” to sophisticated investors. 
1. Prohibiting States 
Most of the states that have restricted online P2P lending 
have targeted only the “investor” or lender side of the P2P 
equation. Currently, twenty-one states ban Prosper.com from 
soliciting investors.203 A few states have gone further, prohibiting 
both investing and borrowing via the sites.204 LendingClub does 
not service borrowers in eight states.205 
Rather than discussing each of the states’ approaches, this 
section discusses one “representative” prohibiting state to 
illuminate the foundation of the prohibition approach. Ohio, 
through its Department of Commerce, Division of Securities, 
blocked Prosper.com from accepting “investors.” The Chief 
Registration Counsel for the Division published a conference 
presentation discussing the state’s reasoning.206  
Ohio requires “merit review” for securities registrants, in 
which the Division of Securities must find that “the business of the 
issuer is not fraudulently conducted . . . that the plan of issuance 
and sale of the securities . . . would not defraud or deceive.”207 
Prosper.com’s registration statement included among identified 
“risk factors” the statement: “Information supplied by borrowers 
                                                                                                     
 203. Those states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, 
Vermont, and West Virginia. Prosper.com, Legal Compliance, http://www. 
prosper.com/legal/compliance.aspx (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 204. Borrowing is prohibited in Iowa, Maine, and North Dakota. Id. 
 205. Those states are Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Mississippi, Nebraska, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, and Tennessee. See LENDINGCLUB CORP., PROSPECTUS 
DATED JUNE 10, 2011, at 90, available at https://www.lendingclub.com/extdata/ 
Clean_As_Filed_20110610.pdf. 
 206. See generally Mark R. Heuerman, Ohio Division of Securities, Peer-to-
Peer (P2P) Lending and Internet Platforms: Ohio Securities Act Implications, 
available at http://com.ohio.gov/secu/docs/Conference2010/MarkHeuermanP2P. 
pdf. 
 207. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.09(G)(2) (West 2012). 
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may be inaccurate or intentionally false. Information regarding 
income or employment is not verified in the majority of cases.”208 
This led the Division to conclude that it was unable to find the 
business was not fraudulently conducted as required by Ohio law.  
Other issues that led to the Ohio decision include the 
possibility that Prosper “itself may fall within the definition of a 
dealer by charging a fee for listing the notes on the platform,”209 
which would require it to comply with broker–dealer regulations. 
The Division also worried that Prosper might be considered an 
“exchange,” in which case it would have to comply with the 
requirements for an exchange.210 
Of course, prohibiting a site from operating within a state may 
not stop some enterprising would-be site users from finding a way 
on to the site. In the brick-and-mortar world of yesterday’s 
securities regulation, regulators knew where to go to stop a 
fraudster from bilking investors. Responding to their denial of 
access to Ohio residents, the sites could (and may indeed have) 
limited access to investing options based on an Ohio Internet 
protocol address being associated with the would-be user. But by 
                                                                                                     
 208. Heuerman, supra note 206, at 5. 
 209. Id. at 8. 
 210. Id. at 8–10. 
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crossing in to a neighboring state and setting up an account with a 
“fake” out-of-state address, a person might be able to evade well-
meaning regulators’ reach.211 
2. Authorizing States 
Twenty states, and the District of Columbia, authorize both 
borrowing and lending via Prosper with no restrictions.212 Twenty-
eight states authorize investment and borrowing via 
LendingClub.213 These states tend to be ones that mirror the SEC’s 
approach to securities offerings, which does not involve merit 
review but simply requires disclosure.214 
3. States Authorizing with Conditions 
A third group of six states authorize investing via online P2P 
sites but only for sophisticated investors meeting “suitability”215 
                                                                                                     
 211. See Forum Post by “HornzUp,” LENDING CLUB PEER-TO-PEER LENDING 
THREAD (Jan. 1, 2011, 11:31 AM), http://www.shaggybevo.com/board/ 
showthread.php/79967-Lending-Club-lt-peer-to-peer-lendinggt?s=1fd327777828 
4852e50eebc3fa1f818&p=2378532&viewfull=1#post2378532 (last visited Apr. 8, 
2012) (“I created an account, with a fictional out of state address. No errors in 
account creation and I am getting emails asking me to go through with the set 
up and move money over from my checking account.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 212. Those states are Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New 
York, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Wisconsin, Wyoming, 
and the District of Columbia. Legal Compliance, supra note 203. 
 213. Peter Renton, Which States Are Open to Lending Club and Proper 
Investors, SOC. LENDING NETWORK (May 11, 2011), http://www. 
sociallending.net/investing-lending/which-states-are-open-to-lending-club-and-
prosper-investors/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 214. See GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 28 (noting that more disclosure-
based states than merit-based states authorize investment and borrowing via 
Prosper and LendingClub). 
 215. Investor “suitability” describes “the duty of licensed securities dealers 
to recommend investment products that are suitable to their clients, in light of 
the clients’ investment objectives and financial means.” Michael Bennett, 
Complexity and its Discontents: Recurring Legal Concerns with Structured 
Products, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 811, 817 (2011). 
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requirements.216 In most of these states, Prosper lending is limited 
to $250,000-net-worth individuals (excluding home) or individuals 
with a $70K income and $70K net worth.217 California imposes less 
stringent requirements and does so only for Prosper investors who 
put in more than 10% of their net worth (to do so, investors much 
have a net worth of $85,000 and an income of $85,000 during the 
last tax year or a net worth of $200,000).218 LendingClub is limited 
to soliciting loans in Kentucky only for individuals with $200,000 
income in the past two years or $1 million in net worth.219  
Among the reasons states impose such restrictions are the 
financial health of the platforms themselves. States imposing such 
restrictions have cited “the risks lenders face, particularly related 
to their reliance on the platforms to screen borrowers and service 
the loans, the companies’ limited verification of information 
supplied by borrowers, and the novelty and untested nature of 
person-to-person lending.”220 Both sites have faced concerns about 
their profitability; Prosper, which has lost money since its 
inception and which, in SEC filings, stated that it might not 
“continue as a going concern.”221  
IV. Creating a Coherent Regulatory Scheme for Online Peer-to-Peer 
Lending 
The current regulatory regime for P2P lending is arguably a 
paper tiger. As explained in the previous section, under the most 
commonly used model for P2P lending, the borrower is protected 
by robust banking regulations that are designed to protect that 
individual from the bank that originates the loan.222 Lenders are 
                                                                                                     
 216. Those states are Idaho, New Hampshire, Virginia, Oregon, and 
Washington. Legal Compliance, supra note 203. 
 217. Hunsberger, supra note 12. 
 218. Legal Compliance, supra note 203. 
 219. Supplement to Prospectus Dated July 30, 2009, LENDINGCLUB, available 
at https://www.lendingclub.com/extdata/ky_prospectus.pdf. 
 220. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 29. 
 221. Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 51 (Nov. 
12, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1416265/000 
141626510000490/p10q9d30d2010.htm#notestofinancialstatementsq32010. 
 222. See supra notes 124–33 and accompanying text (listing various statutes 
that are applicable to the most commonly used model of P2P lending because of 
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protected by robust federal and state securities regulation because 
notes, i.e., securities, are sold to individual lenders with payment 
on the notes being contingent upon repayment of the underlying 
loan issued by the bank.223 If a P2P lending platform wanted to 
remove itself from this robust regulatory regime, the answer is 
simple: Remove the bank. For example, a platform could avoid 
having to comply with banking laws and securities regulation 
simply by providing a service that connects individual lenders to 
individual borrowers for a fee. Providing such connections between 
individuals interested in borrowing and individuals willing to lend 
is a valuable service, even if a platform provides nothing else.224 
If a P2P lending platform opted to provide a service that 
connected individual lenders to individual borrowers, although 
some additional laws might apply, such a model of P2P lending 
would be chiefly regulated by civil and criminal antifraud laws. On 
the federal level, for example, the United States Department of 
Justice would likely take a leading role in regulating P2P lending 
through the use of the federal mail fraud225 and wire fraud226 
statutes and through the use of the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act227 (RICO), under which mail fraud and 
wire fraud are predicate crimes.228 Under this type of model, a 
robust and narrowly tailored system of regulation would be 
replaced by a thin and loosely tailored system of regulation. In 
addition, under such a model, most of the mandated ex ante 
disclosure of information that is required under the current 
commonly used model would be foregone in favor of ex post relief 
from wrongdoing under civil and criminal antifraud laws. 
Because models of P2P lending can vary so drastically, 
creating a new coherent regulatory regime for such lending will be 
extraordinarily difficult. Congress has shown some interest in 
                                                                                                     
the involvement of banks in the lending process).  
 223. See supra Part III (discussing the application of federal and state 
securities law to the most commonly used model of P2P lending). 
 224. See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text (discussing valuable 
service that P2P lending sites provide by connecting individual borrowers with 
individual lenders). 
 225. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006). 
 226. Id. § 1343. 
 227. Id. §§ 1961–1968. 
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modifying the existing regulatory regime for P2P lending, but 
Congress may take a substantial amount of time before it 
addresses the issue. Ultimately, Congress should adopt an 
approach that allows P2P lenders to be regulated in a similar 
manner as traditional banking entities. Multiple regulators should 
have oversight over P2P lending with each regulator being 
empowered to regulate the specific aspects of P2P lending that fall 
within its purview and areas of expertise. Such an approach would 
allow the regulatory regime to grow organically as P2P lending 
continues to morph and evolve. 
A. Peer-to-Peer Lending and the Dodd–Frank Act 
Section 989F of the Dodd–Frank Act mandated that the 
Comptroller General of the United States and the United States 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) conduct a study to 
“determine the optimal Federal regulatory structure” for P2P 
lending.229 In conducting the study, the Comptroller General and 
GAO were required by section 989F to consult with a wide variety 
of entities including, “[F]ederal banking agencies, the [United 
States Securities and Exchange] Commission, consumer groups, 
outside experts, and the person to person lending industry.”230 
Congress specifically mandated that the content of the study 
include an analysis of: 
(A) the regulatory structure as it exists . . . , as determined by 
the [Securities and Exchange] Commission, with particular 
attention to— 
(i) the application of the Securities Act of 1933 to person 
to person lending platforms; 
(ii) the posting of consumer loan information on the 
EDGAR database of the Commission; and 
(iii) the treatment of privately held person to person 
lending platforms as public companies; 
                                                                                                     
 229. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 989F, 124 Stat. 1376, 1947 (2010) (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. app. 
3 § 11). 
 230. Id. § 989F(a)(2). 
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(B) the State and other Federal regulators responsible for the 
oversight and regulation of person to person lending markets; 
(C) any Federal, State, or local government or private studies of person to 
person lending completed or in progress on the date of enactment of this Act; 
(D) consumer privacy and data protections, minimum credit 
standards, anti-money laundering and risk management in the 
regulatory structure . . . , and whether additional or alternative 
safeguards are needed; and 
(E) the uses of person to person lending.231 
Congress also required that the Report analyze “alternative 
regulatory options . . . [and] whether the alternative approaches 
[would be] effective.”232  
Mandating a study represented a compromise between the 
United States House of Representatives and the Senate. Prosper 
Marketplace had lobbied both the House and the Senate 
extensively to make the CFPB the primary regulator of P2P 
lending and to exempt P2P lending from securities law.233 
Representative Jackie Speier, a Democrat from California, 
sponsored a provision in the House version of the financial 
regulatory reform bill that would have placed P2P lending under 
the supervision of the CFPB and removed it from SEC oversight.234 
The Senate refused to pass a similar provision.235 By the time that 
the Dodd–Frank Act was signed into law on July 21, 2010, 
lawmakers had reached the compromise embodied in Section 989F 
of the Act requiring a study.236  
Dodd–Frank’s Section 989F offers several lessons. First, 
Congress has a genuine interest in creating a coherent system of 
regulation for P2P lending. Second, Congress is in need of 
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sophisticated information about P2P lending and how to regulate 
it. Third, Congress, or at least the Senate, is unwilling to take 
radical steps in regulating P2P lending, e.g., assigning the 
regulation of such lending to a new and untested CFPB, until more 
information is available. 
B. The GAO Report on Online Peer-to-Peer Lending 
On July 7, 2011, the GAO issued the mandated report.237 The 
Report is aptly titled Person-to-Person Lending: New Regulatory 
Challenges Could Emerge as the Industry Grows.238 The title 
reflects both that P2P lending continues to grow and evolve and 
that any regulatory regime will need to continue to grow and 
evolve along with it. 
The Report is divided into three main sections.239 The first 
section details the lending models for the major for-profit 
(LendingClub and Prosper Marketplace) and nonprofit (Kiva) P2P 
lending platforms operating in the United States.240 The second 
section discusses the potential benefits and risks of P2P lending 
and the current regulatory regime governing such lending.241 
Finally, the third section of the Report discusses options for 
regulating P2P lending going forward.242 
The first and second sections of the Report are thorough and 
well written. This is little surprise considering the access, 
resources, and expertise of the Controller General and the 
Government Accountability Office. Notably, the drafters of the 
Report had extensive access to a wide range of industry 
participants and regulators during the drafting process.243 
The third main section of the Report, however, is a 
disappointment. The Report addresses only two possible models for 
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regulating P2P lending, which can be boiled down to the following 
single, lengthy sentence: 
We identified two primary options for regulating person-to-
person lending that differ primarily in their approach to lender 
protection: (1) continuing with the current bifurcated federal 
system—that is, protecting lenders through securities 
regulators and borrowers primarily through financial services 
regulators, which will include the newly formed CFPB—or 
(2) consolidating borrower and lender protection under a single 
federal regulator, such as CFPB.244 
The drafters of the Report do provide some additional analysis of 
these models in the remainder of the section, but at an 
unfortunately high level of abstraction.245 
This level of abstraction is in a sense unsurprising given the 
current state of the P2P industry. As the drafters of the GAO 
Report note, “The continuing evolution and growth of person-to-
person lending could give rise to new regulatory concerns or 
challenges, making it difficult to predict what the optimal 
regulatory structure will be.”246 Although the drafters could have 
suggested a variety of radical approaches to regulating P2P 
lending, they discussed the two models that offer the most 
flexibility and likely the best use of existing expertise. However, 
one cannot help but be disappointed that the drafters did not 
discuss a wider range of regulatory options. 
C. Choosing Among a Myriad of Regulatory Options 
A myriad of options exist for regulating P2P lending. Some of 
the more radical options include: 
• Allowing the Online P2P Lending Industry to Self-Regulate 
• Creating an Administrative Agency to Specifically Regulate 
P2P Lending 
• Regulating P2P Lending Similar to Online Gambling 
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• Developing a Harmonized International System of P2P 
Lending Regulation 
• Creating an International Entity to Regulate P2P 
Lending247 
All of these options would likely prove too radical for an industry that 
continues to grow and evolve and entails so many diverse models of 
lending. Instead, the two options identified in the GAO Report are the 
most likely paths forward.  
Even among the two choices examined in the GAO Report, 
however, placing P2P lending under the purview of a single 
regulatory entity, such as the CFPB, would also be a radical step 
because it limits the regulatory supervision of the industry, excludes 
various regulators from using their specific expertise, increases 
concerns about regulatory capture, and creates concerns about 
inhibiting the evolution of a growing and changing industry. Prosper 
Marketplace may have lobbied the House and Senate extensively to 
place P2P lending under the auspices of the CFPB,248 but one has to 
wonder about its motives. This is especially true because both Prosper 
Marketplace and LendingClub admit that they are selling “highly 
risky and speculative” securities.249 Prosper Marketplace wants all 
                                                                                                     
 247. One of the authors of this Article has argued extensively for the 
international harmonization and centralization of securities regulation. See, e.g., 
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Law, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1581 (2010); Eric C. Chaffee, The 
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 248. See Brush, supra note 233 (detailing Prosper’s lobbying efforts to have 
P2P lending regulated solely by the CFPB). 
 249. See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text (containing language 
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the benefits of selling securities without the robust regulatory 
protections for investors that come along with it. Frankly, by 
involving banks and selling securities in its model of P2P lending, 
Prosper Marketplace opted into supervision by both banking and 
securities regulators, and it should not be allowed to cry foul because 
it does not like the model that it chose. Regulation solely by the CFPB 
is defensible if the only or primary concern with online P2P lending is 
the protection of would-be borrowers from excessive interest rates or 
the extension of credit that they would be unable to repay. But with 
online P2P lending, an equally important concern is the protection of 
investors, who purchase securities and sink funds in what are likely 
risky and dangerous investments. The new CFPB, unlike federal and 
state securities regulators, lacks a proven track record of protecting 
and educating individuals purchasing securities. 
Verstein and others assert that the emerging online P2P 
industry is being stifled by overregulation,250 but the industry is 
continuing to grow. Perhaps, the industry is not growing as fast as it 
might be, but traditionally, underregulated financial services 
industries grow quickly until they suffer a dramatic crash.251  
This is not to say that the CFPB should play no role in the 
regulation of P2P lending. In a multiple regulator model, the CFPB 
would obviously be one of the regulators with oversight of the P2P 
lending industry. In the event that a pure model of online P2P 
lending gains popularity, i.e., one in which platforms connect 
individual borrowers to individual lenders for a fee without involving 
a bank, the CFPB would likely play a very robust role in regulating 
both borrowers and lenders. That type of model, however, is not the 
one commonly used in P2P lending today, and the issue of a more 
robust role for the CFPB is not ripe for consideration. 
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The ideal approach to regulating online P2P lending should be 
organic and multifaceted. Multiple regulators should continue to have 
oversight and use their individual expertise from regulating 
traditional lending and securities investments to create and adapt 
regulation to the evolving world of online P2P lending. Such an 
approach will allow the regulatory scheme for P2P lending to grow 
and evolve along with the industry. 
D. The Path Forward 
In the short-term, Congress should adopt a wait-and-see 
approach to regulating P2P lending. The lending model used by both 
Prosper and LendingClub is adequately regulated by existing law. 
Individual borrowers are protected by a thick and robust system of 
lending regulation,252 and individual lenders are protected by a thick 
and robust system of securities law.253 Regulatory agencies should be 
given an opportunity to use their expertise to determine how existing 
statutes and regulations should be applied to P2P lending and the 
opportunity to promulgate new regulations based on their existing 
statutory mandates. 
Assuming that Prosper and LendingClub continue to be the 
dominant players in the P2P industry, and assuming that they 
continue to use the same model for P2P lending, Congress may need 
to modify existing statutes to better protect the parties in P2P 
transactions. With that said, however, P2P lending remains a nascent 
industry, and if Congress acts too quickly, it may stifle its ability to 
evolve in healthy and useful ways. In the long-term, the CFPB may 
be the correct entity to regulate P2P, but it is far too early to decide 
this issue. Placing P2P within the purview of any agencies, including 
the CFPB, would be a mistake because flexibility is needed to 
regulate an industry that continues to morph and reinvent itself.  
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V. Conclusion 
While Section 989F of the Dodd–Frank Act evidences Congress’s 
interest in regulating P2P lending, Congress may take a substantial 
amount of time to promulgate such regulation. The Dodd–Frank Act 
mandates a plethora of studies for purposes of potential future 
regulation, and the study required by Section 989F is just one among 
dozens mandated to be conducted under the Act.254 Although the 
                                                                                                     
 254. See, e.g., Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
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independence) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m); id. § 939D (mandating a study 
on alternative business models for compensating statistical-rating 
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Comptroller General and Government Accountability Office 
completed its study of P2P lending on time, Congress may take years 
to react to it. 
When Congress does ultimately address P2P lending, hopefully it 
will take an approach that mirrors traditional lending and allows the 
P2P lending industry to continue to evolve. P2P lending is not a static 
or fixed concept, and the regulatory regime will need to be able to 
grow and evolve along with it. 
  
                                                                                                     
organizations) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-9); id. § 939E (mandating a 
study regarding creating an independent professional organization for rating 
analysts employed by nationally recognized statistical-rating organizations) (to 
be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-9); id. § 939F (mandating a study of assigned 
credit ratings) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-9); id. § 946 (mandating a study 
of the macroeconomic effects of risk-retention requirements relating to asset-
backed securities) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77g); id. § 967 (mandating a 
study relating to organization reform within the SEC) (to be codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 78d-4); id. § 968 (mandating a study relating to the “revolving door” 
between the SEC and private sector financial institutions) (to be codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 78d-4); id. § 976 (mandating a study regarding increased disclosure to 
investors by issuers of municipal securities) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o); 
id. § 977 (mandating a study of the municipal securities markets) (to be codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 78o); id. § 989 (mandating a study of proprietary trading by 
various financial institutions) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1790d); id. § 989F 
(mandating a study of person-to-person lending) (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. app. 
3 § 11); id. § 989I (mandating a study regarding the exemption for smaller 
issuers from Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002) (to be codified at 
5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 5); id. § 1074 (mandating a study on ending the 
conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and reforming the housing 
finance system) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1757); id. § 1076 (mandating a 
study on reverse mortgage transactions) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5602); id. 
§ 1078 (mandating a study on credit scores) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5602); 
id. § 1406 (mandating a study of shared-appreciation mortgages) (to be codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 1601); id. § 1446 (mandating a study on default and foreclosure of 
home loans) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1701x); id. § 1476 (mandating a study 
on the effectiveness and impact of various appraisal methods, valuation models 
and distributions channels, and on the Home Valuation Code of conduct and the 
Appraisal Subcommittee) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2603); id. § 1492 
(mandating a study on government efforts to combat mortgage foreclosure 
rescue scams and loan-modification fraud) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1437f); 
id. § 1494 (mandating a study on the effect of the presence of drywall imported 
from China during the period beginning with 2004 and ending at the end of 
2007 on foreclosures) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-25); id. § 1506 
(mandating a study of core deposits and brokered deposits) (to be codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 78m). 
